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ABSTRACT 
“HOW DID TOYOTA STAY ON TOP?”: REVISITING 
CRISIS COMMUNICATION DISCOURSE 
 
 
 
Rachel M. Knoespel, B.A. 
 
 
 Marquette University, 2011  
 
 
 
 This study focuses on Toyota’s 2010 accelerator pedal recalls and its use of crisis 
response strategies that relied on past performance.  As a precursor, the author researched 
current literature regarding crisis communication and identified two key areas of 
research: understanding crisis and its impact and crisis response.  To understand crisis 
communication it is necessary to first define a crisis and the impact it has on an 
organization’s image, identity, and/or reputation.  Once the crisis occurs, the organization 
must respond considering the audience, type of crisis, and the phase of the life cycle the 
crisis is in to determine a proper response strategy. 
 
 A close textual analysis was used to analyze 50 artifacts from January through 
March 2010, regarding the recall from Toyota’s website created specifically for the 
recalls.  Through the use of close textual analysis, the author uncovered six themes 
including a focus on updating customers as a united front on the recalls as well as 
attempting to regain its customer’s trust though the recalls and focus on past 
performance; Toyota finally apologizing although it was a masked apology, and exuding 
confidence by explaining its superior technology; and Toyota’s focus on being defensive 
in its responses as well as attacks from media outlets and government agencies.  This 
study has theoretical implications such as the use of identity maintenance as an aspect of 
crisis response, the significance of reputation, and ethical implications. Also, pragmatic 
implications for an organization’s crisis communication discourse which include building 
a strong reputation, if the organization is lack a strong reputation it should rely on identity 
maintenance during the crisis response, and consumers need to be more critical of 
organizations going through a crisis. 
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CHAPTER ONE: 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 Toyota is known in the United States as being one of the best car manufacturers.  
However, this longstanding reputation was questioned on August 28, 2009 when an off-
duty Californian Highway Patrol Officer, Mark Saylor, and his family called 911 from 
his Lexus as the gas pedal became stuck and raced down Highway 125 at over 100 mph 
in San Diego (Healy, 2010).  Bensinger (2010) reported that the final words heard were 
Officer Mark Saylor asking his family to hold on and pray as the Lexus crashed into 
another vehicle.  All four passengers were killed.  When the 911 tape was released to the 
public, the accident quickly became a public relations disaster, and it was discovered that 
this was not the first time that the Toyota Corporation had heard reports about its faulty 
vehicles.  As the fatal crash gained media attention, U.S. Transportation Secretary Ray 
LaHood ordered Americans to stop driving their Toyotas immediately. Toyota recalled 
approximately 5.4 million vehicles due to floor-mat entrapment that fall after the fatal 
crash, and Toyota’s official response asked Toyota owners to remove the floor-mats 
(Bensinger, 2010).   
 In December 2009, before the recall in January of 2010 and only four months 
after the fatal crash in San Diego, another accelerator accident occurred in Southlake, 
Texas (Goodman, 2010).  This crash involved a Toyota Avalon that flipped over into a 
six-foot pond resulting in the death of four more people.  Since the Toyota Avalon was 
involved in the floor-mat recall, the driver had safely removed the floor-mats as 
suggested by Toyota.  Toyota Motor Sales Group Vice President Irv Miller was quoted 
stating, “Toyota has investigated isolated reports of sticking accelerator pedal 
2 
 
mechanisms in certain vehicles without the presence of floor mats” and “our investigation 
indicates that there is a possibility that certain accelerator pedal mechanisms may, in rare 
instances, mechanically stick in a partially depressed position or return slowly to the idle 
position” (Toyota, 2010).   
 According to Rechtin and Greimel (2011, p.1), “Toyota suspended U.S. sales of 
eight models linked to runaway acceleration – and spiraled into a humiliating global 
safety crisis. The company has recalled more than 16 million vehicles globally since the 
fall of 2009 for a variety of problems.”  A recall of this size not only has a large financial 
impact on the company, but potentially has a large effect on the image of Toyota.  There 
have been an estimated 34 fatalities and 22 alleged lawsuits in connection with the 
accelerator problems (Fukue, 2010).   
 Toyota’s unintended accelerator recall is a classic public relations crisis.  This 
crisis is notable due to the size and scope of the recalls, which included eight of Toyota’s 
vehicle models.  Toyota had a fairly spotless reputation prior to the January 2010 crisis. 
Thus, these events had the possibility of changing how people viewed Toyota completely 
and could have potentially brought the automaker down from its front running position.  
However, it only took Toyota three months to respond and recover from this crisis.  In 
many respects Toyota’s floor-mat and sticky accelerator pedal recalls follow patterns 
commonly associated with crisis situations.  In this light, the events are not completely 
unprecedented as in the past large scale crises have captivated public attention, such as 
Tylenol, Union Carbide, the Exxon Mobil oil spill, Firestone, the BP oil spill, and the 
coal miners in Peru.  In the wake of these crises, public relations scholars have devoted a 
great deal of attention to the way in which corporations have managed large scale crises. 
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 Public relations and corporate communication practitioners confront crisis 
situations regularly in just about every industry.  Some large public relations crises of the 
past that have shaped the crisis management industry include the Tylenol crisis in 1982 
where seven people died from a murderer putting cyanide into bottles, Union Carbide’s 
toxic gas leak in 1984 that killed 10,000 people in India, and the Exxon Mobil oil spill 
that spewed 11 million gallons of oil into the waters of Alaska (Hoffman & Ford, 2010).  
More recently, the public has been faced with crises such as Firestone’s tires, four Toyota 
recalls, the BP oil spill, and the coal miners in Peru who were trapped in a mine due to 
faulty inspections.  Stakeholder involvement in corporations is at an all-time high with 
public trust of corporations at an all-time low (Ulmer, 2001).  So while crisis 
communication has been a topic of interest in both theory and practice, the 
communication environment facing corporations has changed. 
 Public relations and communication scholars have developed recommended 
responses that should help an organization navigate a major crisis.  However, in this ever-
changing communication atmosphere with companies growing and becoming stronger, 
the question of whether or not these same strategies will continue to work in the same 
ways is increasingly salient.  The significance of this question is compounded by the 
reality that companies are focusing more on its image, identity, and reputation to 
differentiate themselves from its competitors (He & Mukherjee, 2009).  I believe theory 
and research on crisis communication is dated and more attention should be given to 
understanding how crisis response has changed over time.  This study seeks to fill the gap 
in current understanding of crisis communication research and potentially enhance what 
is currently known. 
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 This thesis evaluates the effectiveness of Toyota’s image repair discourse by 
analyzing artifacts including press releases, speeches, official company statements and 
letters to consumers during the critical phases of Toyota’s public relations crisis.  First, I 
will discuss the basic concepts of crisis communication and map crises within the issue 
life cycle.  Next I will consider the impact of crisis on an organization’s image, identity, 
and reputation.  Finally I will explain how companies respond to crises.  With this 
perspective as a backdrop, I will analyze Toyota’s image restoration discourse of its 2010 
recall using a rhetorical approach.  Specifically, I seek to investigate Toyota’s use of 
current image restoration techniques.   
 A close textual analysis of Toyota’s crisis response reveals several key themes. 
Toyota’s response emerged in three distinct phases.  Based on my analysis, I argue that 
Toyota did not follow conventional wisdom based on current crisis management research 
including the image restoration strategies and yet emerged with relatively positive results 
based on the reputation they created.  Finally, I offer implications that provide direction 
for both theory and practice of public relations and corporate communications. 
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CHAPTER TWO: 
REVIEW OF LITERATURE AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
 
 
 In order to fully understand how Toyota’s crisis management challenges current 
practices, I first examine the most current research in crisis communication.  I break crisis 
management research into two main sections: understanding crisis and its impact, and 
crisis response.  To understand crisis and its impact I looked at the definition of crisis and 
the impact a crisis has on an organization’s image, identity, and/or reputation, and the 
impact an organization’s past performance has on maintaining an organization’s image, 
identity, and/or reputation.  When a crisis occurs, it is the responsibility of the 
organization to respond to the crisis to repair or maintain its image, identity, and/or 
reputation.  When an organization responds to a crisis, it must take into consideration the 
publics it needs to address, the type of crisis, and the part of the life cycle the crisis is in.  
Once all three factors are determined, the organization must choose the crisis response 
strategies that will best fit with each of those factors to produce a positive outcome. 
Understanding Crisis and Its Impact 
 
 
 Waymer and Heath (2007) explain that a crisis represents a fundamental threat to 
the stability of the system, a questioning of core assumptions, and a risk to the company’s 
goals.  In order to gain a deeper understanding of the impact the crisis had on Toyota’s 
image, identity, and reputation, it is important to examine how an organization can 
effectively restore its image through crisis response strategies.  In the subsequent section, 
I define what a crisis is and the impact a crisis will have on an organization’s image, 
identity, and/or reputation. 
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Defining Crisis 
 
 
 Crises can happen in just about every industry, as scholars it is important to 
understand what a crisis is, the course it may take, and the effects it ultimately has on an 
organization.  Dardis and Haigh (2009) define corporate crises as unexpected events that 
both create uncertainty and threaten an organization’s priority goals, while jeopardizing 
the overall image, identity, or reputation of the company or organization.  Jerome (2008) 
defines crisis communication as “the piece of crisis management that consists of the 
verbal, visual, and/or written interaction between the organization and its publics (often 
through the news media) prior to, during, and after the negative occurrence” (p. 124).   
 A crisis represents a particular type of rhetorical exigence in that a crisis creates 
situations in which corporations must respond to ongoing threats.  Hoffman and Ford 
(2010) define “the exigence in crisis management rhetoric is a crisis.” (p. 191).  Crisis 
creates uncertainty and threatens an organization’s image, identity, and reputation.  
Therefore, organizations cannot ignore a crisis situation.  The exigence in any crisis 
situation is influenced by the seriousness of the crisis and how the different audiences 
perceive the organization’s responsibility for the crisis’ occurrence (Benoit, 1995).  
Therefore, strategic planning to respond during a crisis is a good option to remove much 
of the risk and uncertainty and allows the company to have more control over a corporate 
crisis and the result (Jerome, 2008).   
 Although crises can be unpredictable, crises demand diligent focus on 
communication responses.  Ultimately, a crisis threatens an organization’s reputation and 
its relationships with multiple publics and stakeholders (Waymer & Heath, 2007).  Once 
a crisis does occur, it is imperative for corporations to maintain the public’s positive 
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image, identity, and reputation it had of the company prior to the crisis.  Corporate 
responses to crisis represent efforts to shape public perceptions of the crisis and the 
resulting image, identity, and reputation of the company overall (Coombs, 1995).   
Impact on Image, Identity, and Reputation 
 
 
 Crisis response is critical due to the potential harm to image, identity, and 
reputation.  Therefore, to understand the significance of crisis, scholars need to consider 
image, identity, and reputation.  Although image, identity, and reputation are often 
mistaken as being the same concept, each has its own impact on an organization and its 
consumers.  The primary impact of a crisis is the potential damage to the image, identity, 
and reputation of the corporation.  It is vital to an organization’s success that all three 
remain intact throughout an organization’s crisis.  A way for corporations to encourage 
positive attitudes towards it is the creation of a strong corporate image, identity, and 
reputation (Simoes, Dibb & Fisk, 2005).  An area of crisis communication that crisis 
managers could benefit from further development is the communication between an 
organization and its publics (Simoes, Dibb & Fisk, 2005).  The benefit of developing the 
communication between an organization and its publics is the potential to restore or 
maintain its image, identity, and/or reputation once the crisis is over.  A corporation’s 
image, identity, and reputation can all be seen as assets the company own, and therefore 
need to protect during a crisis to ensure no damage is done to any of the three assets. 
Image 
 
 
 Corporate image is the overall impression that an audience has of an organization, 
and is a net result of the interaction of all the experiences, beliefs, feelings, knowledge, 
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and impressions people have about an organization (Abratt, 1989; Simoes, Dibb & Fisk, 
2005).  Abratt (1989) explains that corporate image is made up of details which include 
many pieces comprised from formal or informal signals the company gives off, and the 
receivers of those pieces place together to create its idea of the corporate image of the 
company as they know or see it.  Corporate image, according to Penz and Stottinger 
(2008), is a consumer’s attitudes toward an organization that can create new beliefs about 
a firm and ultimately can influence attitudes toward the company’s products and 
preferences. Lyon and Cameron (2004) present image best by comparing an 
organization’s image to a snapshot, where a person is photographed and we see an image 
of the person not the actual person and everything they truly are.  So despite the fact that 
there are multiple definitions, all suggest that image is the publics’ attitude toward the 
organization created through the experience the organization gives those publics. 
 Melewar (2003) explains that corporate image lies mostly in the heads of the 
company’s stakeholders.  Image is not necessarily what the company believes it to be, but 
instead is the feelings and ideas about the company that the audience holds based on 
personal experience and observation (Abratt, 1989).  The feelings and ideas that the 
company’s audiences hold about the company will become the public’s reality even if it 
does not fully reflect the company’s intended image (Simoes, Dibb & Fisk, 2005).  From 
the company’s point of view it is important to take note that not all impressions given off 
by an organization will contribute equally to the company’s image (Abratt, 1989).  An 
important factor to keep in mind is the organization’s public perception of the 
organization through those experiences and impressions to keep a positive image during a 
crisis, which will likely produce a more positive outcome for the organization. 
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Identity 
 
 
 Whereas image addresses an organization’s impressions and experiences it gives 
to its audiences, the organization’s identity most centrally focuses on the characteristics 
an organization holds to make it unique from all other companies.  An organization’s 
identity is described as, “the central, enduring character projected by an organization, as 
perceived and interpreted by others” (Kuhn, 1997, p. 199).  Aust (2004) explains that 
identity looks to the core, distinctive, and enduring features unique to an organization.  
Abratt (1989) explains identity as “an assembly of visual cues-physical and behavioral 
[sic] by which an audience can recognize [sic] the company and distinguish it from others 
and which can be used to represent or symbolize [sic] the company” (p. 68).  Albert and 
Whetten (1985) argue an organization’s identity is based on three distinct elements: the 
central character of the company, the distinctiveness of the company, and the consistency 
of these elements through time. 
 Melewar (2003) explains corporate identity to be the set of meanings by which an 
organization allows itself to be known and through, which it allows people to describe, 
remember, and relate to the company.  Simoes, Dibb, and Fisk (2005) describe an 
organization’s identity as dealing with the impressions, image, and personality that it 
illuminates to its stakeholders.  Corporate identity is important since it defines the 
essence of an organization and places the company in a playing field with its competitors.  
Consequently, consumers with a positive perception of an organization’s identity will 
have a more positive attitude toward its products (He & Mukherjee, 2009).  A 
corporation’s identity is different from its image, because an identity is a unique group of 
characteristics built over time that must be maintained at all times.   
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Reputation 
 
 
 Reputation is based on the organization’s image and identity and is formed 
through judgments about the organization and the organization’s past performances.  
Reputation is seen as the most unwavering out of all three concepts since it is created 
over a longer period of time.   An organization must work at its reputation, which must be 
earned and maintained by the company’s publics and is ultimately the result of credibility 
and trust (Budd, 1994).  Often companies may feel its reputation is set in stone once it is 
created.  However, it is important for an organization to pay constant attention to its 
reputation because during a crisis an organization’s real reputation becomes evident 
(Druckenmiller, 1993).  Reputations according to Fombrun and Van Riel (1997) are 
difficult to duplicate, since they are formed from the unique features and experiences 
only that firm holds.   
 Reputation is both a product and a process.  It is a product because it consists of 
some level of agreement of opinions, evaluations, or estimations of the nature and value 
of an entity.  It is a process in the sense that reputations are created in social networks 
where communication and influence play a pivotal role (Ihlen, 2002).  It is also seen as a 
reflection of the past accumulated impact of previously occurring events and observed 
identity cues (Melewar, 2003).   Fombrun and Shanley (1990) reveal that reputations may 
enable firms to charge premium prices, since a favorable reputation can generate excess 
returns by inhibiting the mobility of rivals in an industry.   
 An organization’s reputation reflects an overall judgment regarding the extent to 
which a firm is held in high esteem or regard and not necessarily the specific identity it 
holds (Simoes, Dibb & Fisk, 2005).  Caruana (1997) explains that the reputation of an 
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organization is formed based on both direct and indirect experiences and information 
received and can be passed on either directly via word-of-mouth or indirectly thought the 
media or other publics.  To keep an organization in a positive standing with stakeholders, 
it must have a positive image, identity, and reputation.  It only takes one crisis situation to 
threaten what an organization has built over time through its performance history.   
Past Performance 
 
 
 One connection image, identity, and reputation share is that an organization’s past 
performance can enhance all three prior to and during a crisis.  An organization’s past 
performance can be an important factor in a crisis because publics seem to be more 
willing to forgive an organization with a positive performance history than those 
companies with a history of problems (Coombs, 1995).  A positive performance history 
creates credibility for an organization among the company’s many publics because the 
company seems more trustworthy if its past actions have remained positive (Coombs, 
1995).  Images, either positive or negative, are hard to change once a public 
acknowledges that image (Coombs, 1995).  This results in an organization with a positive 
performance history having a halo effect by projecting a positive image through the crisis 
(Coombs, 1995).   
 Performance history can also influence which restoration strategy should be 
selected (Coombs, 1995).  First, a positive performance history should make publics 
more willing to accept claims made by an organization, thus enhancing the effectiveness 
of a source (Coombs, 1995, p. 461).  The nonexistence and distance strategies require 
publics to accept an organization’s definition of the crisis situation (Coombs, 1995).  
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Therefore, these strategies are more effective when backed by an organization’s positive 
performance history (Coombs, 1995).   
 Second, a positive performance history is essential for ingratiation strategies 
(Coombs, 1995).  Ingratiation strategies attempt to create positive impressions of an 
organization to offset the negative impression left by the crisis (Coombs, 1995).  An 
organization can use its positive performance history to generate positive perceptions.  
Once an organization’s image, identity or reputation is threatened due to a crisis, rhetoric 
attempts to restore the company’s image through a response to the crisis to stabilize the 
situation (Brinson & Benoit, 1996).   
 Companies must secure or establish strong image, identity, and reputations, which 
are key assets to obtain before a crisis and are also the main assets that are at risk of being 
threatened due to a crisis.  With the focus on an organization’s past performance, crisis 
managers can remind publics of the positive image, identity, and reputation the 
organization once held and is at stake of losing.  The best crisis management is to have 
created and maintained a positive image, identity, and reputation with all publics 
involved in the organization’s best interest.  Maintenance of those three assets is key to a 
positive outcome and should be maintained strategically through the use of crisis 
response strategies. 
Crisis Response 
 
 
 When an organization is facing a crisis, key factors that need to be considered are 
the organization’s audience, the type of crisis the organization is facing, and the stage in 
the issues life-cycle the crisis is in.  An organization is at risk of having its image, 
identity, and reputation threatened during a crisis.  When an organization’s image, 
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identity, and reputation are at risk the organization must choose the most appropriate 
crisis response strategy to lessen the threat of the crisis. 
Audience 
 
 
 For an organization to successfully respond to a crisis, it needs to be aware of its 
image, identity, and reputation as well as the impact the crisis may have on the company.  
Since a crisis is a particular kind of exigence, the company needs to strategically respond 
to its audiences.  If an image restoration strategy is well-thought out, the audience will 
uphold the positive image, identity, and reputation of the organization they held prior to 
the crisis.  
 According to Ulmer (2001), one critical feature of crisis planning entails 
managing the company’s intricate communication relationships.  Ulmer explains that 
there are only a few companies that have done an exemplary job of crisis management 
communication.  One is Tylenol’s quick response after the tampering.  An important 
group to consider when proceeding through a crisis is the company’s stakeholders since 
crises often threatens the interests of the organization’s stakeholders (Ulmer, 2001).  
Ulmer (2001) defines stakeholders as including suppliers, stockholders, customers, and 
employees. Waymer and Heath (2007) argue that task crisis managers seek to strengthen 
and ultimately restore its relationships with key stakeholders who have been affected by 
the crisis situation. 
 Strong pre-crisis relationships with stakeholders will not help an organization 
avoid every crisis, but they can play an important role in how the crisis is resolved 
(Ulmer, 2001).  Since stakeholders have a vested interest in the company’s success, they 
may serve as advocates for the company during a crisis situation by providing political 
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support and crisis-mitigating resources (2001).  If the stakeholder relationship is weak, 
the stakeholders could easily retract their support during the crisis, which could make 
matters worse (Ulmer, 2001). 
 When dealing with a crisis situation it is important to identify the crisis risks and 
if possible to recognize a crisis before it breaks out (Weiner, 2006). Since public opinion 
about an organization may change very easily during a crisis, it is important the company 
works to obtain a positive opinion from its stakeholders.  The public’s collective opinion 
is one of the most powerful determinants of group behavior (Sturges, 1994).  Sturges also 
explains the interaction of opinions, such as outward expressions of attitudes, beliefs, and 
emotions, results in a dominant opinion amongst all members of the company’s public.  
Multiple publics represent the many relationships an organization has and the varying 
concerns those publics may have (Ice, 1991). Corporate relationships are separated into 
four types of publics: enabling, functional, normative, and diffused (Ice, 1991).   
 Enabling publics have control over allocations of authority and resources and also 
offer regulatory functions for the company (Ice, 1991, p. 343).  Examples of enabling 
publics are governmental agencies, individuals belonging to legislative bodies, regulatory 
groups, and stakeholders (Hoffman & Ford, 2010).  Without these groups there would be 
no proper laws, permits or capital, and the companies would not be able to produce 
products or provide services (Hoffman & Ford, 2010).    Hoffman and Ford (2010) 
explain that enabling publics need to be persuaded that the organization meets industry 
requirements. 
 Functional publics supply inputs to and receive outputs from companies (Ice, 
1991, p. 343).  These publics help the company function on a day-to-day basis (Hoffman 
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& Ford, 2010).  Examples of functional publics include employees who supply labor, 
companies who produce raw materials for the company’s operations, and consumers who 
purchase the products made by the company (Ice, 1991).  These publics need to be 
reassured of their health and safety throughout the crisis (Hoffman & Ford, 2010).   
 Normative publics incorporate norms for the company and represent publics that 
share similar interest with the company (Ice, 1991).  Examples of normative publics are 
associations and professional organizations that face similar challenges (Ice, 1991).  
Normative audiences are often secondary, but often receive rhetoric created by 
companies (Hoffman & Ford, 2010).  These audiences may be interested in how the 
affected company responds, so they may follow their success and avoid their failures.  
 Finally, diffused publics reflect the unorganized publics who may be subject to 
the consequences of the company’s activities (Ice, 1991).   Examples of diffused publics 
include individuals in the surrounding community, interest groups concerned with human 
rights or environmental protection, voters, and representatives of the media (Hoffman & 
Ford, 2010).   
 Describing and understanding the audiences of organizational rhetoric is 
challenging because an organization needs to consider all four categories of audiences 
and the sub-audiences within (Hoffman & Ford, 2010).  Additionally, an organization 
needs to determine if the audiences are likely to be sympathetic, neutral, or antagonistic 
(Hoffman & Ford, 2010).  Each of the four types of audiences may have different 
interests, needs, and expectations of the company that need to be accounted for and 
properly responded to each (Hoffman & Ford, 2010).    
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 A crisis situation has five main factors that affect the attributions publics make 
about a crisis: an organization’s previously held image, its identity, its reputation, the 
different type of crisis, and the response chosen.  Different publics may respond to 
different types of crises in different ways; thus, it is the company’s duty to consider how 
the various publics might view its image, identity, and reputation differently.  These 
factors ultimately have the potential to impact the restoration strategy that should be 
selected.  
Types of Crises 
 
 
 There are typically many different types of crises, and the type of crisis influences 
how an organization is affected by the crisis and in turn chooses to respond to the crisis.  
Coombs (1995) discusses three different types of crises including accidents, 
transgressions, and terrorism.   The different types of crises can also be broken down into 
three clusters of crisis responsibility which are: (1) the victim cluster, where the threat to 
the company’s reputation is mild as seen in terrorism crises, (2) the accidental cluster, 
which represent a moderate reputation threat as seen in accidents, and (3) the intentional 
cluster, where the crisis causes severe reputation threat is often a transgression type of 
crisis (Coombs, 2004).   
 Coombs (1995) describes accidents as being unintentional.  Accidents happen 
during the course of normal company operations and are the result of events such as 
product defects, employee injuries, and natural disasters.  Accidents have been 
subdivided into acts of nature such as hurricanes, earthquakes, drought, epidemics, etc., 
and human-induced errors such as workplace injuries, product defects, industrial 
accidents, etc (1995).  The victim or accidental clusters Coombs (2004) discussed, gives 
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the organization a mild or moderate reputational threat. Examples of accidents can be 
seen in Dick Cheney’s shooting of his friend while hunting, or the nation’s crisis of 
Hurricane Katrina. Noting the significance of the division between an accident and a 
natural act results in the fact that publics are less likely to blame and react negatively to 
the act of nature than to human-induced error.  Publics understand that acts of nature are 
unavoidable, but with accidents they expect the company to be prepared to cope with the 
acts, so some accountability on behalf of the company is necessary (Coombs, 1995).  
Accidental crisis situations are generally random and unintentional which leads to 
attributions of minimal organizational responsibility (Coombs, 1995).    
 Organizations are placed in the category of transgressions when intentional 
actions are taken by companies to knowingly place publics at risk or harm (Coombs, 
1995, p. 457).  Coombs (2004) explains this type of crisis as being an intentional cluster, 
where the company may have ignored or violated laws, human-error recalls, or human-
error accidents.  Coombs (1995) gives examples of transgressions as knowingly selling 
defective or dangerous products, withholding safety information from authorities, 
violating laws, and refusing to award earned rewards to customers.  A transgression 
creates attributions of internal locus and controllability due to the intentional nature of the 
action (Coombs, 1995, p.457).  Mortification restoration strategies, which include 
admittance of guilt and asking for forgiveness, are the best attempt for transgressions, 
because they do not deny responsibility but work to amend the crisis (Coombs, 1995).   
 Another type of crisis that places partial blame on the corporation is the act of 
terrorism, which refers to intentional actions taken by external actors where intentional 
actions harm the company directly, such as employees or customers, or indirectly, such as 
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reduce sales or disrupt production (Coombs, 1995).  Examples of terrorism include 
product tampering, hostage taking, sabotage, and workplace violence (1995).  A known 
case of terrorism is the Tylenol case.   
 There have been countless crisis management cases that have shaped the way 
public relations managers respond to crises.  In seeking to understand effective crisis 
responses, the life cycle and crises type both offer frameworks for developing effective 
crisis response.  Regardless of the type of crises according to Weimer (2006), 
organizational crises are a threat to an organization’s image, identity, or reputation and its 
ability to conduct business.  Ultimately an organization needs to responds accordingly.   
 Coombs explains that one primary task of a crisis manager of an organization is to 
keep the company’s current positive aspects of an image protected from corruption by the 
negative aspects that come with a crisis situation throughout the entire life cycle of the 
crisis. 
Life Cycle 
 
 
 To fully examine a crisis, it is important to examine the issues life cycle to 
understand the progressions a crisis makes throughout its entirety. While there are many 
variations on the life cycle, all have a beginning, middle, and end and follow the same 
basic pattern (Botan & Taylor, 2004; Bridges, 2004; Crable & Vibbert, 1985; Jones & 
Chase, 1979; Sturges, 1994).  Crises progress through a series of five stages that make up 
the “life cycle” and have their own set of dynamics and dimensions (Crable & Vibbert, 
1985; Sturges, 1994, p. 299).  Crable and Vibbert (1985) build on the earlier work of 
Jones and Chase (1979) and say that public policy issues go through five stages that are 
defined by the role played by communication: potential, imminent, current, critical, and 
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dormant. The stages of this life cycle are defined by both which specific publics and how 
many different publics decide to attach significance to an issue (Botan & Taylor, 2004).  
Each phase of the issues life cycle demands a different kind of response from the 
corporation.  
  The first stage, according to Crable and Vibbert (1985) and Sturges (1994), is the 
potential status or prodromal period.  This is the stage where clues or hints begin to 
appear about a potential crisis.  In the case of Toyota it would be the first sign of 
accelerator pedal sticking or not working as smoothly.  Long before a crisis actually 
happens, there are some symptoms that appear.  If these symptoms are recognized early 
enough, an organization can reduce the negative consequences.  Weiner (2006) believes 
the vast majority of crises cases arise when companies fail to identify an issue at an early, 
benign, stage and begin to develop a plan of action to manage the issue before the issue 
manages the company. 
 The crisis breakout or imminent status is the next stage where the triggering event 
causes a crisis to erupt.  This often times results in the physical, fiscal, and emotional 
trauma to an organization and its publics (Sturges, 1994).  Crable and Vibbert (1985) 
explain this as the stage where more people begin to realize the significance of the crisis 
and become invested in the issue.   
 When an issue is in current status, it is a widely accepted topic of conversation 
that is often enhanced by media outlets (Crable & Vibbert, 1985).  In this phase the 
information regarding the crisis is dispersed on a large scale.  Often this is when the 
company chooses to respond after an assessment of the situation and the weighing of 
options.  At this stage, rhetorical efforts include monitoring the rhetorical situation to 
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determine how the company will respond to influence the issue (Hoffman & Ford, 2010).  
At this point, Toyota began the recall process of the vehicles for floor-mat pedal 
entrapment as well as the sticky accelerator pedal. 
 An issue reaches critical status once people have begun to take sides, according to 
Crable and Vibbert (1985).  Crable and Vibbert also note that the company’s publics have 
now made a decision and begin to move forward in voicing their opinions such as voting 
on the issue or enacting a policy.  Toyota’s response to this stage was defensiveness once 
media outlets and the government agencies decided Toyota was wrong.  
 Finally, abatement or dormant status is the last stage, where a decision has been 
made about the issue and the effects of a crisis may linger for years (Crable & Vibbert, 
1985; Sturges, 1994).  In cases of crises there may be charges, counter-charges, 
demonstrations, inquiries, legal actions, and continuing coverage by mass media that will 
prolong the effects of the crisis (Sturges, 1994).  One of the key objectives of crisis 
management is damage control, to prevent drastic negative attitudes in the relationship 
between an organization and its publics (Sturges, 1994).  It is important to keep all 
publics informed with accurate, appropriate, and productive information to ensure a 
positive image among all publics.  Along with keeping an organization’s publics 
informed throughout the crisis life cycle, Sturges (1994) explains the company benefits if 
its image, identity, and/or reputation remains positive no matter what type of crisis it is 
experiencing. The rhetoric an organization chooses as a crisis response is also a key 
aspect to an organization’s successful transition through a crisis. 
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Crisis-Response Rhetoric 
 
 
 The three factors an organization needs to consider before determining its 
response is the type of crisis, the phase of the life cycle the crisis is in, and the audience 
the company is responding to.  Crisis response may be divided into two categories, the 
first being the form (e.g., being quick, consistent, and open), and second being the 
content (e.g., what is actually being said in the messages sent to the targeted publics).   
The Theory of Image Restoration Discourse 
 
 
 Image restoration theory is one scheme that integrates all factors including image, 
identity, and reputation into a theoretical framework that outlines typical crisis response.  
This framework is fitting because it focuses specifically on that which is most threatened 
in a crisis, the organization’s identity.  Millar and Heath (2004) explain that corporations 
may take preventative and restorative approaches to deal with image issues, and it is best 
to manage issues before they become image threats.  It is important to remember that 
when a crisis becomes an image, identity or reputation threat, companies must respond, 
hence choosing a response strategy fitting for the situation, audience, and timing of the 
crisis.   
 Image restoration theory assumes that communication is a goal-directed activity 
in general—one that is used to restore or protect an organization’s image, identity, or 
reputation when being accused of wrongdoing (Benoit, 1995; Brinson & Benoit, 1996).  
This is not the only goal, or even the most important goal, but it is one of the central 
goals in crisis communication (Benoit, 1995).  The use of image restoration strategies 
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attempts to restore an organization’s image, identity, or reputation after an organization 
has been accused of wrong-doing (Benoit & Drew, 1997).   
 Research on image repair, according to Benoit and Drew (1997), focuses on 
general image repair strategies: excuses used to reduce responsibility for the act, 
justifications used to reduce the offensiveness of the act, denials of committing the 
alleged act, and apologies or concessions that express remorse for committing the act 
(Benoit & Drew, 1997; Brinson & Benoit, 1996).  Image restoration strategies are 
organized into five broad categories including: denial, evasion of responsibility, reducing 
offensiveness, corrective action, and mortification (Benoit & Drew, 1997).   
 An organization that is forced to defend itself against the suspicions or attacks of 
others has a few options including denying that the act ever occurred, denying that the act 
was committed by the company or person in question, or admitting that the act was 
performed but that it was in no way harmful.  Tylenol used denial by explaining they had 
in no way performed the action of adding cyanide to the contaminated capsules (Pauly & 
Hutchison, 2005).  Tylenol also went on to shift the blame of the tampering to an 
unknown murderer who was not associated with the company, thus separating the 
company as the victim (Pauly & Hutchison, 2005).   
 Shifting the blame allows the rhetor to place responsibility for the offensive act 
from the rhetor to another person, cause, or company, claiming the offensive act was 
performed by others (Benoit & Drew, 1997).  Firestone shifted the blame during its crisis 
by blaming Ford for its vehicles being the issue with tire failure, as well as blaming the 
customers for not keeping its tires properly inflated at all times (Blaney, Benoit, & 
Brazeal, 2002).  Another aspect of denial is the counter-attack based apologia that first 
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attempts to label the charges against the company as false (Hearit, 1996).  Second, it 
implies that the charges are false and questions the integrity of the company’s accuser, 
thus making the accuser look unethical and groundless (1996). 
 Organizational rhetors may be able to repair their image by evading or reducing 
responsibility for the offensive act through using provocation, defeasibility, accident, or 
good intentions (Benoit, 1997a; Brinson & Benoit, 1996).  Provocation suggests that the 
accused performed the offensive act in response to another wrongful act done prior, 
which understandably provoked the undesirable offensive reaction in question.  This 
behavior, in turn, can be seen as a reasonable reaction to that provocation (Benoit, 1997a; 
Benoit & Drew, 1997).  If the other party agrees that the rhetor was justifiably provoked, 
the provocateur may be held responsible instead of the rhetor (Benoit, 1995).   
 Defeasibility acknowledges that the company had a lack of information or control 
over important elements of the crisis, and rather than denying that the event actually 
occurred, the rhetor attempts to suggest the lack of information implies that the company 
or person should not be held fully responsible for the act (Benoit, 1995; Benoit & Drew, 
1997).  President Bush used defeasibility when describing Hurricane Katrina as not being 
a normal hurricane and it was an extraordinary disaster (Benoit & Henson, 2009). 
 If an organization can convince the audience that the act occurred by accident, the 
organization should be held less accountable, and the damage to the organization’s image 
will be greatly reduced (Benoit, 1997b).  The rhetor can also suggest that the offensive 
behavior was done with good intentions.  In this case the offensive act is not denied; yet, 
the audience is asked not to hold the rhetor responsible due to the act being done with 
good intentions (Benoit, 1995; Benoit, 1997a).   
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 A person or company that is accused of wrongful actions can also try to reduce 
the perceived offensiveness of the act, the degree of ill will associated with the act.  This 
strategy has six variants including bolstering, minimization, differentiation, 
transcendence, attacking one’s accuser, and compensation (Benoit, 1995; Benoit, 1997a).  
These six strategies attempt to reduce the adverse feelings audiences hold toward the 
rhetor by increasing the audience’s regard for the rhetor or decreasing their negative 
feeling about the offensive act (Benoit, 1995). 
 Bolstering may be used to strengthen the audience’s positive feelings toward the 
accused rhetor, which offsets the negative feelings toward the offensive act through 
focusing on describing positive characteristics the company has or positive acts they have 
done in the past (Benoit, 1997a).  During the Exxon Valdez oil spill crisis the company 
claimed it was moving swiftly and showed sympathy to the State of Alaska.   
 To minimize the negative feelings associated with the offensive act, words used in 
the response discourse may include “just,” “only,” or “simply” to attempt to prove the 
situation is not as bad as it is perceived.  (Benoit, 1995; Benoit, 1997b).  Engaging in the 
strategy of differentiation allows the rhetor to distinguish the offensive act performed by 
comparing to other crises that are similar but more offensive.  Thus, in comparison the 
act may appear to be less offensive than the other offensive actions (Benoit, 1995; Benoit, 
1997a).  Transcendence attempts to place the act in a more favorable context by 
explaining the offensive actions by pointing to higher values to justify the actions 
(Benoit, 1997a; Benoit, 1997b).  Hoffman and Ford (2010) use the example of animal 
rights activists violating the law by breaking and entering to release animals.  In response 
they pointed out that it was in the best interest of saving animals’ lives.   
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 Attacking one’s accuser should move the publics’ attention away from the rhetor 
originally being accused, thus reducing damage to their image (Benoit, 1995).  According 
to Benoit (1995): 
If the credibility of the source of accusations may be reduced, the damage to one’s 
image from those accusations may be diminished.  If the accuser is also the victim 
of the offensive act (rather than a third party), the apologist may create the 
impression that the victim deserved what befell him or her; attacking the accuser 
may tend to lessen the perceived unpleasantness of the action in question, again 
improving the rhetor’s reputation. (p. 78)  
Compensation is often used to reduce offensiveness of an action through positive 
reinforcements such as money, goods, or services to help counteract audiences’ negative 
feelings toward the offensive act (Benoit, 1995; Benoit & Drew, 1997).  Ultimately, 
compensation may be seen as a bribe to win over the audience (Benoit, 1995).   
 Corrective action promises to fully repair or correct the problem as Benoit 
(1997a) explains by restoring the state of affairs back to the existing state before the 
offensive act took place and/or promising to prevent the recurrence of the offensive act.    
This may be seen as a component of an apology, yet often occurs without an actual 
apology (Benoit, 1997a).   
 The final strategy for image restoration is to admit to guilt of the offensive act, 
and to confess and beg forgiveness, which Burke labels “mortification” (Benoit, 1997b).  
Mortification may include expressing regret for the role in the offensive act or the 
consequences of the act, and requests forgiveness (Benoit & Drew, 1997).  Weiner (2006) 
argues the fact that the company must take responsibility in sympathizing or even 
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publicly apologizing for the crisis event that has occurred.  A potential drawback to this 
strategy is it could bring about lawsuits from victims for admitting guilt.  Choosing a 
mode of crisis response based on the company’s publics, the type of crisis the company is 
experiencing, and the phase the crisis is in the life cycle, will yield a positive outcome for 
the company based on previous knowledge held by scholarly research. 
 The theory of image restoration focuses on responding to a crisis through chosen 
strategies based on the crisis, audience, and point in the life cycle the crisis is in.  Each 
category of image restoration strategies works to help an organization through responding 
to its crisis.  This theory is used to restore or protect and organization’s image, identity, 
and/or reputation when threatened due to a crisis.   
Summary and Research Questions 
 
 
 Companies that experience a crisis must manage the crisis throughout its entire 
life cycle to ensure there is minimal effect on their image, identity, and/or reputation.  
Choosing the best crisis response strategies for the specific type of crisis and stage in the 
life cycle will also aid in decreasing negative ramifications for the company.  Since 
companies are becoming larger and stronger with stronger reputations, it is important to 
revisit the known scholarly research regarding crisis management. 
 Toyota is an organization that has had fairly few crisis issues.  Now it has 
experienced a major crisis that cost human lives.  Toyota has emerged from the sudden 
accelerator crisis relatively successfully.  Thus, it is important to look at how the 
company accomplished it, and the implications it may have for future crisis 
communication research. 
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 Image restoration strategies are tried and true; however, have not been re-
examined within today’s contemporary communication climate.  Toyota seemed to 
engage in a series of missteps from a communication standpoint, but at the same time 
Toyota seems to be managing successfully.  This begs the question how it is 
accomplishing this.  This study provides a response by presenting the results of a close 
textual analysis of Toyota’s discourse.  I investigate what image restoration techniques 
Toyota used, if any.  The following general research questions are offered: 
 RQ1:  What crisis response strategies did Toyota use during its 2010 crisis 
situation? 
The goal in using image restoration strategies is to protect or restore an organization’s 
image, identity, and/or reputation.  As seen earlier, an organization’s past performance 
history can not only influence which strategies to use, but also enhance the effectiveness 
of the strategy chosen with the organization’s publics. 
 RQ2:  What role did past performance play in Toyota’s response? 
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CHAPTER THREE: 
METHODOLOGY  
 
 
 To explore the way Toyota responded to the crisis caused by the faulty 
accelerators, I conducted a close textual analysis.  A close textual analysis focuses on a 
group of artifacts to uncover common themes within all of the artifacts.  In what follows, 
I outline the details of the case, the data that is the basis for this study, and an explanation 
of close textual analysis. 
Rhetorical Situation 
 
 
 Toyota has maintained a fairly flawless track record with regard to car companies 
and recalls.  The company has always been one of the top car manufacturers, and the 
recalls it encountered were minimal never enough to be a full-blown crisis.  The crisis 
became public after two large crashes that became public and Toyota was ordered by 
NHTSA to begin recalls.  From reviewing the data it seems the types of target audiences 
include enabling, such as the government agencies like NHTSA, functional, consisting of 
employees, consumers, and suppliers, and diffused publics, which would be the media.  
 The full scope of Toyota’s floor-mat and sticky accelerator pedal crises began to 
come to light early 2010.  The crisis affected over 16 million vehicles taking the lives of 
34 drivers (Fukue, 2010; Rechtin & Greimel, 2011).  Although there are speculations that 
Toyota was aware of the issues prior to this time, Toyota did not respond until the crisis 
reached the current status of the issues life cycle.  Since this was so late in the issues life 
cycle to begin responding to Toyota’s crises, I presumed there would be a greater threat 
to its image, identity, and reputation.  One thing helping Toyota is its prior reputation for 
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being a safe and reliable car manufacturer.  Toyota took advantage of its pre-existing 
positive image, identity, and reputation, and spoke to the confidence it held surrounding 
those three organizational assets.  Toyota used its identity being threatened to its benefit 
as a way to respond to the unintended accelerator crisis. However, Toyota has managed 
to remain one of the leading car manufacturers. 
Data 
 
 
 Data was collected by retrieving all press releases, speeches, official company 
statements, and letters to consumers created by Toyota regarding unintended acceleration 
during the months of January, February, and March of 2010.  I obtained a total of 50 
artifacts from the website Toyota created in response to the floor-mat and sticky 
accelerator pedals.   
 The actual events of the crisis have been covered widely by the media and need 
not be repeated, but it is relevant to examine the rhetorical issues posed by Toyota’s crisis 
response.  To uncover the rhetorical themes and to find the overarching story of its crisis 
response of its unintended accelerator crisis, a close textual analysis was conducted.  This 
method allows the researcher to: (1) understand what is written, (2) understand how the 
rhetor has given the written words meaning, and (3) evaluate how well the rhetor 
accomplished its persuasive goals.  It is important to be mindful of repetition within the 
text and message strategy responses used to uncover the themes hidden within the 
artifacts. 
Data Analysis 
 
 
 
 Lucan (1988) explains  
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 The pupose fo the critic is not simply to retell the speech in his or her own words, 
 but to apprehend it fully from the inside out to break down its rhetorical elements 
 so completely as to determine how they function individuall and to explain how 
 they interact to shape the text as a strategic, artistic response to the exigencies of a 
 particular situation (p. 13). 
This method works best by giving attention to the “internal dynamics of the text itself” 
(1988, p. 13).  Finally, critics must move away from what it written to what meaning it 
produces for them to uncover the hidden persuasive themes within a group of artifacts 
(Leff, 1986). 
 Close textual analysis posits that close reading of a text can reveal and explicate 
the precise, often hidden, mechanisms that give a particular text rhetorical effect 
(Warnick, 2010).  Employing this method will show the affect on its audiences reviewing 
these artifacts.  Warnick also explains that critics who employ a close textual analysis 
method linger over words, verbal images, elements of style, sentences, argument patterns, 
and entire paragraphs and larger discursive units within the text to explore its 
significance.  It is important to keep the text at the forefront of the analysis and reward 
critics who return to the text again and again, which “slow down the action within the 
text” through multiple careful readings (Lucas, 1988, p. 249). 
 The method that I selected seeks to evaluate the rhetoric’s ability to meet its goal 
and perhaps describe the characteristics of messages that would have more effectively 
met that goal (Hoffman & Ford, 2010, p. 105).    It is important to determine 
effectiveness by comparing the rhetorical strategies that are found in the artifact with 
what is already known about the rhetorical situation (Hoffman & Ford, 2010).   
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 After describing all of the rhetorical strategies present in the artifacts and 
identifying the elements of the rhetorical situation, the first evaluative step is to compare 
the demands of the situation with the rhetorical strategies selected by the company rhetor 
(Hoffman & Ford, 2010).  Next, the rhetorical strategies are examined to see the choices 
Toyota made from all of the possibilities and how meaning was assigned.  Finally, an 
attempt at understanding Toyota’s choices and how those choices were evident in the 
resulting rhetoric will be made.   
 The second step in evaluative reading is to conduct a preferred reading (Hoffman 
& Ford, 2010).  This uses known knowledge of the rhetorical strategies and situation to 
make an argument about what I think Toyota wanted its audience to think, feel, or believe 
after receiving the rhetoric (Hoffman & Ford, 2010).   
 The third step is to draw conclusions about the effectiveness, where I decide if 
there were enough of the right types of strategies used to effectively address the 
constraints, and resolve or minimize the issue (Hoffman & Ford, 2010).   
 To this end, I read through the 50 artifacts to identify key themes.  I re-read the 
artifacts to verify the themes were consistent the second time around.  I then went back 
and connected the themes found with relation to my research questions.  In what follows, 
I present the results of my analysis, which were the themes united front, past 
performance, masked apology, confidence, superior technology, and defensive. 
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CHAPTER FOUR:  
 
RESULTS 
 
 
 While analyzing the artifacts, I found that Toyota’s crisis response discourse 
exhibits three distinct types of responses within Crable and Vibbert’s crisis life cycle.  
The three distinct types of responses I found that fall within the current and critical stages 
are: 1) a focus on updating customers as a united front on the recalls as well as attempting 
to regain its customer’s trust through the recalls and focus on past performance; 2) 
Toyota’s apology, although it was a masked apology that exuded confidence by 
explaining its superior technology; and 3) Toyota’s focus on being defensive in its 
responses to attacks from media outlets and government agencies.   
 Since Toyota responded publicly five months after the initial accident, there are 
no press releases during the potential and imminent stages when people were beginning 
to question the unintended accelerator issue.  This study only looks at public information 
regarding Toyota’s response, but Meisenbach and Feldner (in press) explain that although 
Toyota seemed quiet during the potential and imminent phases, they were investing time 
and money in developing relationships with those who create policy about and oversee 
the industry.  Thus, Toyota has actively managed the potential issue of vehicle problems 
through the establishment and maintenance of relationships with key government 
officials by having over 31 lobbyists in Washington (Meisenbach & Feldner, in press).  
Toyota routinely hires former employees of the National Highway Traffic Safety 
Administration (NHTSA), and maintains personal and professional relationships with 
legislators who chair key committees related to automobile industry oversight 
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(Meisenbach & Feldner, in press).  I do not discuss Toyota’s efforts that were done 
behind closed doors for the simple fact I lack access to these documents. 
 In looking at Toyota’s response, I saw at how it unfolded over time.  As it moved, 
it took different approaches in different phases.  The three months, January, February, 
and March, that Toyota responded publicly fall in the current and critical stages of the 
crisis life cycle.  Through those two stages, Toyota’s argument shifted three times to 
create different arguments.   During the current stage, Toyota explained the unintended 
accelerator issue and provided updates regarding the recall.  The critical stage consisted 
of Toyota becoming defensive toward publics who began to side against Toyota.  Rather 
than seeing one clear response in each of the two phases, Toyota’s argument shifted 
multiple times within the current and critical phases of the crisis life cycle.    
Phase 1:  United Front and Past Performance 
 
 
 Toyota responded publicly in the current stage of the crisis life cycle, where the 
unintended accelerator issue now becomes an accepted topic of conversation.  At this 
point Toyota began recalls and started working on informing those customers affected by 
the recalls as well as those governmental bodies who are concerned with the lateness of 
Toyota’s response to the crisis.  Two themes emerge from this first phase, which are 
Toyota’s united front and its focus on past performance. 
United Front 
 
 
 When analyzing the press releases, the first theme that emerged was that Toyota 
spoke with a united front.  Toyota did this by using similar or the exact same quotes 
throughout the three month crisis response, as well as standing together as Toyota to 
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resolve the issues.  Toyota employees, which Ice (1991) labels as functional publics, were 
all told the same things and presented the same stance on each topic of discussion 
regarding the crisis. 
 On the surface, the Toyota press releases during January, February, and March 
2010 may seem to suggest Toyota was hiding something through its use of repetition of 
key discussion points such as minimizing the severity of the issue through comparing 
unintended acceleration to every other major car manufacturer, the apology with an ever-
waiving confidence and focus on the company’s past performance. However, moving 
beyond the surface, I argue this repetition represents a particular kind of consistency.  
Toyota’s primary statements reflect a primary concern for maintaining a united front 
throughout every aspect of its crisis response.  One accepted goal of crisis response 
communication that all employees and stakeholders, who may have a voice during an 
organization’s crisis, have the same information to share with the varying publics.  
Toyota took this a step further by using similar wording and repeating various statements. 
 One statement that is seen continuously throughout the crisis response is made by 
Jim Lentz, President and Chief Operating Officer, on February 1, 2010, “Nothing is more 
important to us than the safety and reliability of the vehicles our customers drive.”1 This 
statement is both repeated by Jim Lentz in subsequent press releases as well as quoted by 
other members of the Toyota team such as on February 24, 2010, by Yoshimi Inaba, 
President and Chief Operating Officer of Toyota Motor North America who stated, “We 
are committed not only to fixing vehicles on the road and ensuring they are safe, but 
making our new vehicles better and even more reliable,”2 and Chairman and CEO of 
Toyota Motor Sales and Shinichi Sasaki on March 2, 2010, Executive Vice President of 
35 
 
Toyota Motor Corporation who stated, “We are redoubling our commitment to always 
put our customers – and their safety – first.”3  These statements of ensuring safety and 
reliability of the vehicles Toyota’s customers drive represents the bolstering strategy by 
seeking to enhance Toyota’s character by emphasizing positive aspects of the company.  
Through pointing to positive aspects such as Toyota’s concern for safety, its customers, 
and making new vehicles better and more reliable, Toyota offsets the negative feelings 
regarding the crisis. 
 It became clear that Toyota’s goal as a company was to restore customers or 
functional publics’ trust in the reliability of the vehicles.  Toyota accomplished this 
multiple ways, through multiple press releases.  On February 1, 2010, Toyota announced, 
“Dealers will work extended hours to complete the recall campaign as quickly and 
conveniently as possible, some even staying open 24 hours a day.”4  Toyota as a whole 
also decided it was best to stop production and explained, “Stopping production is never 
an easy decision, but we are 100% confident it was the right decision.”5  Toyota spoke as 
a united front by banding together as one and providing quick service during the recall 
process, stopping production, and working extended hours.  Jim Lentz, sought to restore 
customer’s trust when he declared:  
 We are focused on making this recall as simple and trouble-free as possible, and 
 will work day and night with our dealers to fix recalled vehicles quickly. We want 
 to demonstrate that our commitment to safety is as high as ever and that our 
 commitment to our customers is unwavering.6   
Corrective action is expected during a recall, Toyota restates the ways it will correct the 
situation for its current customers who “purchase and drive our vehicles.”7  Much of the 
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language used in the press releases conveys the idea that Toyota as a united group felt 
that the company had gone above and beyond for those drivers affected by the sticking 
accelerator pedal crisis.  This was done by explaining that dealers were working extended 
hours or open 24/7, providing free car washes, and oil changes.8  Much of the additional 
compensation Toyota focused on to counteract the negative feelings customers may have 
been about the potential danger of a sticking accelerator pedal.  Also, it should be 
expected by customers that a major car manufacturer go above and beyond to please its 
customers in a time of anguish. 
 Throughout Toyota’s crisis response discourse, the united front is conveyed 
through discussion of how Toyota would help current customers and meet their needs; 
yet, company press releases did not focus on anything directly regarding future or 
potential customers or diffused publics who might be affected by the crisis.  The only 
statement that might include the potential customers as an audience and presented as a 
united front is that, “stopping production is never an easy decision, but we are 100% 
confident it was the right decision.”9  Toyota stopped production, which aids in the 
potential for future customers to not have to deal with a sticking accelerator pedal as the 
current customers are dealing with.   
 Toyota used the minimization strategy to minimize the seriousness of the sticking 
accelerator pedal crisis.  Toyota made the claim that the issue of unintended acceleration 
has been a part of the auto industry for decades, probably since the invention of the brake 
and accelerator pedals themselves.10  To some this may give off the impression that there 
is nothing an automaker can do in cases of unintended acceleration since it happens to 
everyone, and it is a united issue throughout the auto industry.   
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Past Performance 
 
 
 A second theme that emerged during the initial stages of Toyota’s response was 
that Toyota focused a large amount of its crisis response on past performance.  Toyota 
did this by reminding customers and government bodies of all the good Toyota has done, 
how long Toyota has been doing all of these great things and the trust everyone held in its 
vehicles. Toyota is known for producing quality cars that have great performance, 
comfort, and reliability.  As a way to remind its customers of Toyota’s reputation prior to 
the crisis, it relied on reminding customers of its spotless performance history and sought 
to assure customers that the company would restore levels of trust to what it once was.  
Throughout its crisis response, Toyota often looked back to what the company did as far 
as production, how long the company has been producing quality cars, and the trust 
Toyota customers have with Toyota.   
 Since Toyota has always been a top ranking car maker, the company consistently 
reminded customers and governmental bodies that “Toyota has always prided itself on 
building high quality, durable cars that customers can depend on…and I know that we 
have let you down.”11  Toyota’s response spends little time attending to the idea that it is 
to blame for not responding to the sticking accelerator pedal issue before it became an 
issue, or once it did become an issue, responded quickly since they did not respond 
publicly until almost five months after the first fatal crash in August. 
 Toyota reminded its publics of how long it has been producing reliable vehicles 
and argued that this one mistake should not affect the way they look at Toyota today.  
Toyota reminded its publics that they have provided Americans with cars and trucks that 
are safe and reliable for two generations.12 Toyota also explained they were “determined 
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to live up to the high standards people have come to expect from Toyota over the past 50 
years.”13  This was done instead of simply apologizing for the crisis that erupted and 
affected 10 million vehicles around the United States.  Toyota reminded customers that 
Toyota’s: 
 First priority is the safety of our customers and to conclude otherwise on the basis 
 of one  internal presentation is wrong.  Our values have always been to put the 
 customer first and ensure the highest levels of safety and quality… and [sic] a 
 renewed commitment to transparency are all designed to reaffirm these values.14 
While Toyota reassured its customers of its strong values, but also asked its customers to 
not lose faith in the company due to one crisis.   
 This first phase used the image restoration strategies bolstering, corrective action 
and minimization.  The primary target audience was the customers, also known as 
functional publics, as a means of reinstating a lack of trust due to the recall.  The two 
themes, united front and past performance, fit with what is to be expected when an 
organization responds to a recall for the first time.  Companies are expected to speak as a 
united front during a crisis situation to ensure all publics are united as one; this was done 
to restore the Toyota’s damaged image, identity, and reputation by explaining positive 
aspects of the company. 
Phase 2:  Masked Apology, Superior Technology, and Statement of Confidence 
 
 
 The second set of responses Toyota used is also in the current stage of the crisis 
life cycle, where the unintended accelerator issue was an ongoing topic of conversation 
and concern.  Toyota now shifted focus to explaining the confidence it had in the 
company and attempted to persuade its publics to have the same confidence. This phase 
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does not emerge until the beginning of February about two weeks after Toyota began to 
publicly manage the crisis.  Three themes emerge from this second phase, which are 
Toyota’s masked apology, superior technology, and focus on confidence. 
Masked Apology 
 
 
 Early arguments focused on establishing a united front and reassuring the 
strengths of Toyota’s reputation to project the image of the company and avoid a full 
apology.  Toyota maintained the stance until the magnitude of the crisis grew to a point 
where the company presumably was compelled to apologize.  However, in reviewing 
company statements, I argue that rather than providing a direct apology, Toyota presented 
what I am calling a masked apology.  By masked apology, I mean Toyota used the word 
apologize and yet continued to describe the confidence the company held in restoring its 
image. 
 The masked apology theme that emerged is seen through Toyota’s use of apology 
for issues that were related to the crisis, but fall short of claiming any fault for the 
accidents themselves.  This is seen when Toyota stated, “We deeply regret the concern 
that our recalls are causing for our loyal customers, and we are making an all-out effort to 
develop and implement effective remedies as quickly as we can.”15  While Toyota did use 
apologetic words such as deeply regret to show remorse, Toyota was remorseful for the 
concern the recalls had rather than the accident itself.  Toyota as an organization united to 
focus a large part of its crisis response discourse on its past performance and attempted to 
ignore the issue of the crisis.  In the end, the added explanation and reiteration of 
confidence functioned to mask the apology.  It is true that admitting guilt and apologizing 
for the deaths of people and the recall can often come back to hurt an organization in a 
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recall situation if those people injured decide to sue for damages, but Toyota began an 
apology and never fully finished saying it.   
 On February 24, 2010, Akio Toyoda, President of Toyota Motor Corporation and 
Committee on Oversight and Government Reform also used a masked apology.  He 
began by stating, “I would first like to state that I love cars as much as anyone, and I love 
Toyota as much as anyone” and went on to explain that “ in the past few months, our 
customers have started to feel uncertain about the safety of Toyota’s vehicles, and I take 
full responsibility for that.”16  He also accepted responsibility, but his commentary 
stopped short of a full apology by focusing only on the lost confidence of customers.  
Although given in the form of an apology, Toyota seemed to be sorry for a tarnished 
image more so than failures of product, thus the label of a masked apology.  Later in 
Toyoda’s testimony, he attempted to explain the reasoning for the crisis that,  
 Toyota has, for the past few years, been expanding its business rapidly.  Quite 
 frankly, I fear the pace at which we have grown may have been too quick.  I 
 would like to point out here that Toyota’s priority has traditionally been the 
 following First; Safety, Second; Quality, and Third; Volume.  These priorities 
 became confused, and we were not able to stop, think, and make improvements as 
 much as we were able to before.17   
The company’s basic stance according to Toyoda, “to listen to customers’ voices to make 
better products has weakened somewhat.” 18 
 Also hidden were the apologies for two of the major accidents that the sticking 
accelerator pedal crisis led to such as that in Harrison, New York.  Akio Toyoda gives a 
blanket apology saying, “I am deeply sorry for any accidents that Toyota drivers have 
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experienced.”19  The wordage, if glanced at quickly, shows to be a sincere apology for 
what has happened.  However, there is again no explanation of what Toyota did or did 
not do to prevent the crisis.   
 To go further in depth, the statement regarding the Harrison, New York accident 
went along the same lines apologizing by saying, “Toyota sympathizes with the 
individuals and families involved in any accident involving our vehicles.”20  Toyoda 
apologized for any accidents Toyota drivers experienced.  However, it proved to be a 
masked apology because he apologized for Toyota drivers being in a car accident, though 
not necessarily claiming blame for the cause of the accident.  Akio Toyoda also 
apologized for the San Diego accident saying, “I would like to extend my condolences to 
the members or the Saylor family for the accident in San Diego.  I would like to send my 
prayers again, and I will do everything in my power to ensure that such a tragedy never 
happens again.”21  Both “apologies” sympathized or sent condolences for something that 
happened involving a Toyota vehicle, not due to a Toyota vehicle.  Although Toyota is 
timid when apologizing, discussing the  manufacturer’s superior technology comes a bit 
easier. 
Superior Technology 
 
 
 At the same time the company offered these masked apologies, Toyota continued 
to explain its confidence.  In these late phases, rather than looking at Toyota’s past 
reputation Toyota looked at technology.  Toyota’s confidence in its superior technology 
emerged through the discussion about its superior engineering and the engineering firm, 
Exponent.  Toyota hired Exponent to assess any mechanical inquiries related to the crisis.  
Exponent was the engineering company Toyota hired that consisted of scientists, 
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physicians, engineers, and regulatory consultants who performed research or analysis 
with important information such as what caused unintended acceleration in Toyota 
vehicles.  
 Much of Toyota’s argument about what is truly causing unintended acceleration 
in its vehicles rested on its assumptions such as this one from John Hanson, National 
Environmental Safety and Quality Communications Manager.  “I encourage you to 
consider science, rather than suggestion, in the debate on these matters.”22  Toyota 
officials believed they had top-notch technology in its industry that could not possibly 
have caused any errors such as unintended acceleration in its vehicles.  Toyota showed it 
was correct through media reports by explaining, “Toyota Motor Sales (TMS), U.S.A., 
Inc. offered key preliminary findings of technical field examination and testing that were 
performed on March 10 and 11 regarding an alleged “runaway Prius” event dramatically 
covered by national news media.”23
 The discourse on the Exponent begins with Toyota explaining that the company 
has retained a well-respected engineering and scientific consulting firm, to conduct a 
comprehensive, independent analysis of Toyota and Lexus vehicles using the ETCS-I 
system (Electronic Throttle Control System with intelligence) for concerns related to 
unintended acceleration.24  This firm has given an interim report to Congress producing 
no evidence that unintended acceleration in any of the ETCS-I equipped Toyota and 
Lexus vehicles they tested.   
 Toyota also explained Exponent’s progress report as having 
  Two Ph.D. level engineers and support staff repeated the tests described on 
 multiple vehicles.  Two other senior  level engineers independently repeated 
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 several of the tests.  The report was then reviewed by four Ph.D.-level engineers 
 before its release.  It was further reviewed by two senior level professionals.  The 
 scope and methodology of these tests are clearly detailed in the report, providing 
 all of the information necessary for the results to be independently verified.25 
With Toyota shifting the focus off of the results and placing importance of the level of 
education the engineers have, Toyota seemed to be putting full faith in the firm.  Toyota 
attempted to persuade governmental bodies that Toyota was taking responsibility in 
correcting the errors found.  The company was also proving to those same bodies that it is 
not Toyota’s fault the unintended acceleration had occurred as a result of Exponent’s 
findings by explaining Toyota, “will, of course cooperate.”  The company maintained 
“Toyota engineers have comprehensively tested our ETCS under both normal and 
abnormal conditions including electromagnetic interference, and we have never found a 
single case of unintended acceleration due to a defect in the system.”26  The theme 
focused on repeated emphasis on technology, a strategy that suggest both confidence and 
implies that the incidents were not tied to technology.  On February 22, 2010 Paul 
Williamsen explained that Toyota has the “highest order of redundancy, of error 
checking, and of fail safes for the throttle control of virtually any subsystem of the engine 
management system.”27  Toyota’s focus on superior technology may have also allowed 
Toyota to suggest the driver was to blame without having to acknowledge this or place 
blame.  If Toyota’s technology is not to blame, and the equipment the vehicles have 
always used is not to blame, the only source that was not blamed is the driver. 
Confidence 
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 The second theme I found was that Toyota emphasized confidence in its 
technology, future endeavors, and restoring confidence in the public.  Along with Toyota 
maintaining complete confidence in Exponent, another theme I found was confidence that 
Toyota had in just about every aspect of this recall as well.  Toyota is confident that the 
vehicles have no pedal issues and are completely safe to drive, the brake override system 
is just being added to help customers regain confidence, there are no problems in the 
electronic throttle control system, and the solutions and repairs done will help Toyota 
remain the safest on the road today.  
  Much of Toyota’s confidence was aimed at keeping its drivers confident, the 
government, as well as possibly self-persuasion to convince all three groups that Toyota 
was doing everything to say in everyone’s good graces.  Toyota’s confidence began by 
addressing current customers who have yet to encounter issues with its accelerator pedal 
by saying, “if you are not experiencing any issues with your pedal, we are confident that 
your vehicle is safe to drive.”28  This statement could be used to restore confidence in 
drivers who are a part of the recall that have currently had no issues with its accelerator 
pedal.  Toyota routinely used the word confidence as seen on February 5, 2010 Toyota’s 
press release titled and focused on the subject matter, “Toyota Dealers Going Above and 
Beyond to Take Care of Customers, Rebuild Confidence and Trust.”29   
 Toyota noted the company would go an extra step to help boost confidence for 
Toyota drivers.  U.S.A., Inc. Today announced that “it will install a brake override 
system on an expanded range of customers’ vehicles to provide an additional measure of 
confidence.  The brake override system is not an integral part of the recall remedy, but is 
instead being added as an extra measure of confidence for Toyota owners.”30  This extra 
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measure of compensation seems to be done to help improve confidence issues among 
Toyota drivers and implies that it is not necessary, but Toyota is going beyond basic 
expectations.  With all of the government bodies’ uncertainty, it seems as though Toyota 
would go the extra step to make sure the government bodies are satisfied with the steps 
Toyota has taken such as stopping production and obtaining an engineering firm.   
 One issue Toyota was confronted with was that its electronic throttle control 
system was the reason the accelerator pedal issue was occurring.  Toyota explained a few 
times that it is confident there are no issues with the electronic throttle control system.  
Toyota used its past performance to show its confidence in its system by saying, “Toyota 
has sold more than 40 million cars and trucks with our electronic throttle control system 
(ETCS) and we are very confident that the system is not the cause of unintended 
acceleration.”31  The themes past performance and superior technology result in Toyota’s 
confidence with its vehicles and restoring its publics’ trust and confidence with the 
company. 
 Toyota ends its confidence statement by explaining Toyota has “rigorously tested 
our solutions and are confident with these repairs, Toyota vehicles will remain among the 
safest on the road today.”32  Again, Toyota goes back to past performance as well as the 
confidence Toyota owners once had with the company and expects everyone to forget 
about the recall that has just occurred or how long it took the company to be forthcoming 
with the information.  Toyota used the image restoration strategies mortification, 
bolstering, and shifting blame with the end result of this phase being a focus on Toyota’s 
confidence and the restoration of confidence in its publics.  The primary target audiences 
were customers and governmental bodies with the aim of restoring confidence among 
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both publics through discussing its superior technology, and leading the reading to 
suggest that Toyota is not to be blamed. 
Phase 3:  Defensive response 
 
 
 The third and final stage Toyota enters into is the critical stage of the crisis life 
cycle.  At this point Toyota was faced with opposition from many of its publics who 
doubted the company’s reliability.  Toyota began to lash back at media outlets, 
professors, governmental bodies, and even customers who have been in accidents due to 
its vehicles.  This was seen the end of February in its press releases.  One theme became 
clear in the third phase when Toyota began using defensive language and started to 
counter-attack instead of its previous confidence rebuilding language. 
Defensive 
 
 
 Early on Toyota’s press releases were fully informative and attempted to portray 
confidence as well as instill confidence in its publics; however, the latter part of the recall 
shows a defensive reaction from Toyota.  One of the themes I found was that Toyota 
became defensive about topics.  One example includes Dr. David Gilbert’s story that 
aired on ABC News, the idea that unintended acceleration happens to every vehicle 
maker, a legal memo that is mischaracterized, the reported runaway Prius, and NHTSA’s 
database being difficult to understand. 
 According to Toyota, Professor David Gilbert of Southern Illinois University had 
“results of thorough evaluations of his demonstration of apparent “unintended 
acceleration” in Toyota and Lexus vehicles as described in his Preliminary Report and in 
his testimony at recent Congressional hearings.”33  Gilbert explained his claim to Toyota 
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prior to going on ABC News; yet, when the show aired the claim was not the same.  
Gilbert “appears to be introducing a different external and artificial method to manipulate 
the throttle.”34  Toyota aimed to set the record straight 
 Toyota welcomes the opportunity to evaluate the Toyota Avalon shown in today’s 
 story and the method by which Mr. Gilbert allegedly caused the vehicle to 
 accelerate unintentionally.  We welcome the attendance of ABC News at any such 
 evaluation of this vehicle and Mr. Gilbert’s testing.35 
Toyota continued to raise serious concerns about Gilbert’s validity, methodology and 
credibility of a demonstration of alleged “unintended acceleration”36   
 Toyota continued to become defensive about the ABC segment, and instead of 
proving Gilbert wrong though using Exponent’s research as a rebuttal, Toyota insists on 
stating he is wrong. 
Toyota went on to explain  
 The analysis of Professor’s Gilbert’s demonstration establishes that he has 
 reengineered and rewired the signals from the accelerator pedal. This rewired 
 circuit is highly unlikely to occur naturally and can only be contrived in a 
 laboratory.  There is no evidence to suggest that this highly unlikely scenario has 
 ever occurred in the real world.  As shown in the Exponent and Toyota 
 evaluations, with such artificial modifications, similar results can be obtained in 
 other vehicles.37 
Since Toyota was not present to see exactly what Gilbert did as far as reengineering and 
rewiring, it is unclear how Toyota came to the conclusion that both were done and not 
that its vehicle may actually be faulty.  Toyota also makes the claim that its vehicle was 
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“actively manipulated to mimic a valid full-throttle condition” and “substantially similar 
results were successfully created in vehicles made by other manufacturers.”38  This 
reinforces Toyota’s earlier claim that this problem affects the entire car manufacturing 
industry. Thus, in these later phases of Toyota’s response the company went on the 
offense to correct what they believed was misinformation. 
 Toyota claimed that, “there has been a great deal of confusion, speculation and 
misinformation about unintended acceleration in the past several weeks – much of it 
fueled by unsupported claims by trial lawyers and its paid advocates.”39  Toyota 
continued to be defensive when attacked about the idea of its vehicles having unintended 
acceleration issues, and seem to be aiding in the confusion, speculation, and 
misinformation.  Its main defensive rebuttal statement is that “unintended acceleration 
can be caused by many factors and they are not all sudden or sustained.  The category is 
very broad, affects all major automakers, and can include issues involving cruise control, 
air conditioning, transmission surges and pedal misapplication.”40  Toyota attempted to 
minimize the issue by maintaining that it happens to all major automakers.  This can be 
concluded that everyone driving a vehicle is vulnerable to unintended accelerator issues, 
which one can argue is a false assumption and claim to be made by Toyota.   
  A 2005 privileged legal memo that was recently subpoenaed by Congress also 
deals with the topic of sudden unintended acceleration.  Toyota felt as though various 
media reports mischaracterized this memo to make the company look unfavorable.  
Although Toyota claims “the words “unintended acceleration” or “sudden acceleration” 
and “sudden unintended acceleration” appear nowhere in this memo.  They go on to 
explain, “the only reference to sudden unintended acceleration in Mr. Greenberg’s entire 
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40-page complaint is a short paragraph referencing unrelated reports of alleged sudden 
acceleration incidents.”41  Although Greenberg may not have been complaining about 
sudden acceleration as the main topic, he does touch on it occurring showing Toyota had 
an idea it was occurring before the 2010 recall. My analysis of the data suggest that 
Toyota shifted strategies to become defensive and systematically respond to all 
accusations.   
 Toyota responded defensively again when news media covered the “alleged 
“runaway Prius”42 event” that Toyota feels was dramatically covered.  In an attempt to 
save its image, Toyota explained it was testing and examining this case and “there are 
strong indications that the driver’s account of the event is inconsistent with the findings 
of the preliminary analysis.”43  Not only does Toyota attack its accuser, the national news 
media, but goes on to attack the Toyota driver who they perceive is either lying or being 
inconsistent.  On March 15, 2010 Toyota explains, “the emergency operator repeatedly 
instructed the driver to shift the car into neutral and turn off the power button” and a 
follow up report describes, “the front brakes showed severe wear and damage from 
overheating.”44  Thus, without pointing fingers, Toyota shows evidence that suggests that 
the driver of the vehicle was at fault. 
 The last group Toyota attacked was NHTSA and its accident database for not 
being specific enough.  Toyota explained that “it is important to remember that many of 
the complaints in the NHTSA database, for any manufacturer, lack sufficient detail that 
could help identify the cause of an accident or, in some cases, even the specific vehicle 
involved.”45  This is Toyota’s attempt to explain why it took so long to make the public 
aware of the accident.  Instead of admitting any guilt, Toyota immediately became 
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defensive and shifted the blame to NHTSA.  As Toyota was defensive, it primarily used 
the image restoration of shifting the blame and targeted public included media outlets as 
well as governmental bodies. 
 Throughout the first two phases, Toyota focused its attention on the positive 
aspects the company including 50 years of making quality vehicles, the trust its publics 
had in the company, and the superior technology Toyota has and continues to enhance.  
The last shift in phases turned to a defensive tone when Toyota’s publics began to doubt 
Toyota due to the recalls. 
Summary of Phases/Discussion 
 
 
 During the first phase, when Toyota is in the current stage of the crisis life cycle, 
Toyota uses its past performance as a way to regain its customers’ trust in the company 
and product.  As a united team Toyota calls attention to the company’s past performance 
and reminds us of how great of an organization they have been up until this phase.  
Toyota uses Coombs strategy of using past performance as being an important part of 
crisis management, and Toyota also reminds us of its great track record explicitly 
throughout this first phase.  Toyota used past performance and it seems to fit in line with 
what is currently known about the strategy.  Coombs (1995) assures that past 
performance can be an important factor in a crisis because the different publics are more 
willing to forgive an organization with a positive performance history since the company 
seems trustworthy. 
 In phase 2 Toyota continues to use past performance, but couples this with 
additional arguments being masked apology and confidence.  Toyota does not simply use 
one strategy in each phase, but shifted its argument three times within the same phase to 
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create three different arguments - - first being masked apology, then Toyota’s focus on its 
superior technology, and finishing with its exuding confidence.  Here I saw Toyota 
apologizing for the events that have occurred, or for the stress it has caused in its 
customers’ lives, which could seem genuine.  I question the sincerity of the apologies 
since Toyota uses mortification and confidence in themselves often within the same press 
releases.  An example of this is seen when James Lentz, prepared a testimony.46  He 
explained, “For two generations, we have provided Americans with cars and trucks that 
are safe and reliable.  And we fully intend to produce even safer, high quality vehicles in 
the future...”  He continues saying, “We acknowledge these mistakes, we apologize for 
them and we have learned from them.”  Toyota led with how great Toyota has always 
been and gives the sense they will be great in the end no matter what.  It ends with a 
small apology with a focus on how spectacular its performance is.   
 The way Toyota has used past performance enhances the research that we know 
and have studied about past performance.  Beyond traditional crisis response strategies, 
Toyota’s responses seemed to rely more heavily on identity maintenance rhetoric. 
Hoffman and Ford (2010) explain that identity rhetoric is done consistently over time and 
focuses heavily on demonstrating that the company upholds community standards and 
contributes to community causes.  Although Toyota does not speak to contributing to 
community causes, they do focus on how the company has in its past performance upheld 
community standards, if not exceeded them. 
 Toyota’s final shift occurred when it entered the critical stage where Toyota felt it 
was being attacked and began to lash out.  The switch in phases to a defensive response is 
a radical change from how it responded for the first two months in reminding its publics 
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of its past performance, the confidence the company holds, and updates about the recalls.  
Toyota begins to use defensive language and comments against everyone who has 
doubted Toyota including media outlets, governmental bodies, Professor David Gilbert, 
as well as its own loyal customers.  Hearit (2006) labels this strategy as counter-attack, 
where the company combines denial with pointing the finger at its accusers.  Toyota used 
this strategy throughout the last month of its crisis management through press releases. 
 Throughout the press releases analyzed, Toyota’s unintended accelerator crisis did 
break down into phases of a crisis life cycle as previously studied.  However, Toyota 
shows that the phases of the life cycle may need to be more fine-tuned.  The way the life 
cycle is set up now gives the impression that the company provides one primary 
argument per phase.  Toyota had multiple arguments that shifted in its current stage of the 
life cycle.  As scholars, it is important to review the benefits of having shifting or more 
than one argument in the different phases of the life cycle, since it is likely that 
organizations will not stick with one argument per stage in the life cycle. 
 Benoit’s image restoration strategies were used by Toyota in its crisis 
management rhetoric.  Toyota did not use the strategies as a major tool, but the strategy 
focused most on was bolstering.  Bolstering was used by describing Toyota’s positive 
characteristics or acts it has done in the past.  This strategy was also used closely with 
past performance to remind its publics about its almost spotless reputation for creating 
quality cars.  Very little of its crisis response rhetoric focused on the crisis being its fault, 
for which Toyota used differentiation to compare unintended acceleration to other car 
companies having the same issue, Toyota remained confident its past performance and 
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good deeds would prevail in the end.  Ultimately, this strategy of bolstering and past 
performance worked for them since it has been relatively successful. 
 Although Toyota did use image restoration strategies that were previously 
discussed, its press releases do not read like image restoration discourse.  The press 
releases read more like identity management rhetoric since Toyota points out positive 
aspects.  Hoffman and Ford (2010) describe identity maintenance as the company must 
recognize exigencies that may be used to improve how audiences perceive the 
organization, and must take advantage of those identity-enhancing opportunities.  
Although during the crisis was a unique time for Toyota to use identity maintenance and 
enhance its identity through this crisis, it ended up working for Toyota.  If Toyota did not 
have such a strong reputation going into the crisis, I do not think this strategy would have 
worked in its favor.  Toyota relied heavily on reminding its publics of the its past 
performance, confidence, and trust the audience held with the company, and without 
having had the preexisting reputation Toyota had, the audience would not have had a 
positive reaction. 
 Ultimately, Toyota did follow some of the crisis management guidelines and it 
also created its own.  Toyota used past performance as the main focus of its argument and 
remained confident the company would restore its publics’ trust back to what it once was.  
However, in managing the crisis the company employed strategies most associated with 
identity maintenance rhetoric which is generally not associated with crisis situations.  The 
strategies Toyota chose to use for its crisis response rhetoric worked out for the company 
since much of the conversation surrounding recall has ceased.  
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CHAPTER FIVE: 
CONCLUSION 
 
 
 I started this project with the aim of discussing Toyota’s image restoration 
strategies used in its crisis response.  Through analyzing the text, I discussed Toyota’s 
image restoration strategies as well as uncovered a shift in its responses throughout the 
life cycle.  Toyota began speaking as a united front to provide updates regarding the 
recalls, shifted into providing an apology while describing the confidence the company 
had in itself and its audience, and finally ended by becoming defensive toward all who 
objected to Toyota.   
 In this final chapter, I first present the limitations to this study.  Next I suggest 
ways that my findings may add to the theory of identity maintenance, the significance 
reputation has in restoring an organization’s image, and ethical implications.  I also 
suggest ways that my findings may aid in future crisis management for companies.  
Finally, I suggest future research opportunities. 
Summary of Findings 
 
 
 This study examined the crisis response strategies Toyota used during its 2010 
unintended accelerator crisis and the role past performance played in Toyota’s response.  
Toyota’s crisis management turned out to be effective and people are still purchasing 
Toyota vehicles, even after being found at fault for not reporting or starting recalls in a 
timely fashion and being cited.  Toyota’s sales in 2008 were down about 20% than in 
2009 and remained consistent in 2010 after the recalls, so the recall ultimately stabilized 
its business (Toyota.com, 2010).  This study begins to answer to the question of how 
55 
 
Toyota did it.  It was important to first look at the current crisis management research to 
be aware of what companies are being told to do during a crisis situation.    
 I studied all of Toyota’s public press releases which were found on Toyota’s 
website, though a close textual analysis.  This is where I discovered Toyota responded in 
three distinct phases during only two of the crisis life cycle stages, which were the current 
and critical stages.  The themes that emerged were: Phase 1 where Toyota spoke as a 
united front and focused on its past performance; Phase 2 where Toyota finally provided 
a masked apology while also explaining its superior technology and exuding confidence; 
and Phase 3 where Toyota began to feel threatened and lashed back with a defensive 
response.  I concluded by examining how the themes worked together.  Using masked 
apology and confidence together seemed to reduce the strength of Toyota’s apology. 
Limitations 
 
 
This study contains two limitations.  First, I only analyzed publicly available 
documents from Toyota.com in Toyota’s Newsroom.  By having access to non-public 
documents, I may have had more of a full story behind Toyota’s crisis management.  I 
also did not look at Toyota’s advertising efforts regarding the recalls. 
The second limitation is that Toyota’s recall is ongoing.  When I began this study 
the unintended accelerator crisis ended as far as public responses.  Just recently Toyota 
announced two more floor-mat recalls and amended the 2009 floor-mat recall.  This study 
only analyzed the unintended accelerator recall, and the press releases from January, 
February, and March of 2010.  By only analyzing a piece of the entire group of recalls 
Toyota has announced, I did not obtain the entire picture of its crisis management. 
 
56 
 
Theoretical Implications 
 
 
 Despite these limitations, the results of this study hold implications for identity 
maintenance, the significance of reputation, and the model of organization integrity.  
First, this study expands on identity maintenance as an aspect of crisis response through 
Toyota’s use of the rhetoric.  Second, I indicate the significance of reputation ultimately 
being stronger that an organization’s image.  Finally, I compare the ethical implication 
Toyota’s response creates when compared to Redding’s model of organizational 
integrity. 
 Although I began this study expecting to analyze the press releases and find that 
Toyota used image restoration strategies, I found more identity maintenance rhetoric.  
Much that was discussed was Toyota’s positive aspects.  Hoffman and Ford (2010) 
explain that identity maintenance should be done consistently over time.  Toyota 
effectively used identity maintenance to reinforce the core elements of its identity and 
reputation its publics held prior to the crisis.  The results found prove that identity 
maintenance also works as an aspect of crisis response, instead of its current use of 
something an organization does at all times  This study points to the findings that 
scholars need to adopt this model as a useful tool as a crisis response strategy. 
 Along with identity maintenance rhetoric, the results found prove an 
organization’s reputation plays a significant role in the outcome of an organization’s 
crisis.  This finding suggests that scholars need to shift the focus from the different 
strategies currently used, to how an organization can create a strong reputation with its 
publics as Toyota did.  The results show an organization going through a crisis can lean 
on its reputation by reminding its publics of the positive past performance examples that 
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led the public’s to having such a strong reputation with the company.  I suggest that a 
focus on reputation rather than image is imperative for a positive crisis outcome.  
Previous research has focused on image restoration and is not as strong in the realm of 
reputation maintenance. 
 Finally, following the assumption that an organization must act responsibly and 
ethically to enhance the outcome of a crisis, I found that Toyota questioned the standards 
we hold organizations to. So we must re-examine our theories of ethics for how we can 
hold companies to ethical standards.  Johannasen, Valde, and Whedbee (2008) explains 
there are six habits to handle ethical issues well including: (1) solving ethical problems 
directly and reflectively, (2) interacting responsibly, (3) modeling integrity, (4) sharing 
organizational purposes and directions, (5) valuing stakeholder perspectives, and (6) 
practicing personal integrity.  The findings show that Toyota only followed one habit, 
valuing stakeholder perspectives when Toyota made sure to address all governmental 
issues that arose.  Thus, it can be recommended that complete ethicality and complete 
disclosure during a crisis is not necessary.  Although Toyota received a citation for not 
acting ethically and disclosing information in the beginning of the crisis, they managed to 
prevail which indicates a departure from scholarly work on ethicality in crisis situations. 
Pragmatic Implications 
 
 
 Along with providing theoretical implications for crisis communication and 
public relations scholars, this study also contributes to our understanding of how 
companies can lean on reputation as well as consumers need to become more critical.  
Previous research gives companies different strategies to use to prevent the demolishing 
of its reputation throughout its crisis situation.  The results of this study indicate it would 
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be beneficial for an organization in similar situations to build a strong reputation before a 
crisis occurs.  Toyota created and maintained a strong reputation and was then able to 
rely and lean on its reputation to make it through its unintended accelerator crisis. 
 I also recommend that if the company has not yet created a solid reputation to 
lean on during a crisis, they may use identity maintenance during the crisis.  By 
reminding the company’s publics of the positive aspects or acts the company has or has 
performed may also help an organization through its crisis management with a positive 
reputation.  Although it is best to have a strong positive reputation before a crisis occurs, 
the results show that a focus on an organization’s past performance will carry the 
company’s current reputation throughout the crisis. 
 In addition to offering recommendations to companies in crisis situation, I would 
also recommend that a consumer needs to be more critical of an organization going 
through a crisis.  Consumers should demand that companies address issues fully.  My 
analysis revealed Toyota lacked details regarding the deadly accidents, the full severity of 
the recall if not acted on immediately, and prevention regarding future recalls.  I advise 
consumers to be more cautious of companies going through a crisis, until hearing the full, 
truthful story. 
Future Directions and Conclusion 
 
 
 Although the purpose of this study was to discover the crisis response strategies 
Toyota used and the role past performance had in Toyota’s response, I suggest that future 
studies regarding crisis management or Toyota specifically should consider three future 
directions being technology, trends in responses throughout the crisis life cycle and all of 
Toyota’s crises.  There is a gap in the current crisis management research regarding 
59 
 
technology and its growing effect on how an organization responds to a crisis situation.  
Since our technology is getting faster and companies’ publics are becoming more 
technologically savvy it is important to uncover how companies can stay ahead of 
technology when responding to a crisis.  While reviewing current literature about crises, I 
expected to come across suggested trends in response strategies through the crisis life 
cycle.  I assumed an organization would be advised to apologize first and work through 
the image restoration strategies in a methodological order, but there was a hole in this 
area.  Also, since I was unable to look at only one of Toyota’s crises to discover its crisis 
response it would be best to explore the big picture of how Toyota was so successful 
financially and with its stable reputation throughout all of its ongoing crises. 
 This study emerged during Toyota’s crisis when the topic was large on everyone’s 
mind.  Since Toyota did not follow the traditional crisis management advice and 
remained what seems to be perfectly in place sparked my interest in what this case can 
teach scholars regarding updating the traditional advice we give companies in similar 
situations.  The first part of this study looks to the traditional crisis management advice 
scholars may give to companies.  The results of the study reveal that Toyota did use some 
traditional crisis response strategies, but more so focuses on its past performance and 
pointing out the positive aspects of the company with little regard to the negativity of the 
recall.  
 This study enriches crisis communication and public relations scholars’ and 
practitioners’ understanding of how companies can choose to respond in a crisis situation.  
As we become aware of the lack of information regarding negative aspects of an 
organization or recall and an overwhelming amount of information regarding an 
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organization’s positive aspects, we can update the advice we give companies that are in 
pre and current-crisis stages.  It is important that scholars continue to study how 
companies navigate crises and come out on top through the ever-growing atmosphere of 
bigger, stronger companies that hold a large part of the industry’s market share such as 
Toyota.  Finally, it should be acknowledged that an organization’s image can be both 
threatened during a crisis, as well as a resource for a crisis response to repair an 
organization’s threatened image.  
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NOTES 
 
1
 See http://pressroom.toyota.com/pr/tms/toyota/toyota-announces-
comprehensive-153311.aspx 
2
 See http://pressroom.toyota.com/pr/tms/document/Y._Inaba_Testimony_to_ 
House_Committee_on_Oversight_and_Government_Reform_2-24-10.pdf 
3
 See http://pressroom.toyota.com/pr/tms/document/S._Sasaki_Testimony_to_ 
Senate_Committee_on_Commerce_Science_and_Transportation_3-2-10.pdf 
4
 See http://pressroom.toyota.com/pr/tms/toyota/toyota-announces-
comprehensive-153311.aspx 
5
 See http://pressroom.toyota.com/pr/tms/toyota/toyota-announces-
comprehensive-153311.aspx 
6
 See http://pressroom.toyota.com/pr/tms/toyota/toyota-announces-
comprehensive-153311.aspx 
7
 See http://pressroom.toyota.com/pr/tms/document/Y._Inaba_Testimony_to_ 
House_Committee_on_Oversight_and_Government_Reform_2-24-10.pdf 
8
 See http://pressroom.toyota.com/pr/tms/toyota/toyota-dealers-nationwide-have-
153560.aspx 
9
 See http://pressroom.toyota.com/pr/tms/toyota/toyota-announces-
comprehensive-153311.aspx 
10 See http://pressroom.toyota.com/pr/tms/2010-toyota-electronic-throttle-
154266.aspx 
11
 See http://pressroom.toyota.com/pr/tms/toyota/toyota-talks-to-customers-about-
153320.aspx 
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12
 See http://pressroom.toyota.com/pr/tms/document/Lentz_Testimony_to_ 
House_Committee_on_Energy_and_Commerce.pdf 
13
 See http://pressroom.toyota.com/pr/tms/toyota/toyota-dealers-nationwide-have-
153560.aspx 
14 See http://pressroom.toyota.com/pr/tms/toyota-statement-regarding-documents-
154117.aspx 
15See http://pressroom/toyota.com/pr/tms/toyota/toyota-update-regarding-recalls-
153243.aspx 
16
 See http://pressroom.toyota.com/pr/tms/document/A._Toyoda_ 
Testimony_to_House_Committee_on_Oversight_and_Government_Reform_2-24-10.pdf 
17
 See http://pressroom.toyota.com/pr/tms/document/A._Toyoda_ 
Testimony_to_House_Committee_on_Oversight_and_Government_Reform_2-24-10.pdf 
18See http://pressroom.toyota.com/pr/tms/document/A._Toyoda_ 
Testimony_to_House_Committee_on_Oversight_and_Government_Reform_2-24-10.pdf 
19 See http://pressroom.toyota.com/pr/tms/document/A._Toyoda_ 
Testimony_to_House_Committee_on_Oversight_and_Government_Reform_2-24-10.pdf 
20 See http://pressroom.toyota.com/pr/tms/toyota-statement-on-harrison-ny-
155656.aspx 
21
 See http://pressroom.toyota.com/pr/tms/document/A._Toyoda_ 
Testimony_to_House_Committee_on_Oversight_and_Government_Reform_2-24-10.pdf 
22
 See http://pressroom.toyota.com/pr/tms/2010-toyota-electronic-throttle-
154266.aspx 
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23
 See http://pressroom.toyota.com/pr/tms/toyota/toyota-offers-preliminary-
findings-155268.aspx 
24
 See http://pressroom.toyota.com/pr/tms/toyota-update-exponent-report-
153820.aspx 
25
 See http://pressroom.toyota.com/pr/tms/toyota-update-our-work-with-exponent-
154254.aspx 
26
 See http://pressroom.toyota.com/pr/tms/toyota-statement-on-march-23-trial-
155777.aspx 
27
 See http://pressroom.toyota.com/pr/tms/2010-toyota-electronic-throttle-
154266.aspx 
28
 See http://pressroom.toyota.com/pr/tms/toyota-statement-on-comments-by-
153448.aspx 
29
 See http://pressroom.toyota.com/pr/tms/toyota/toyota-dealers-nationwide-have-
153560.aspx 
30See http://pressroom.toyota.com/pr/tms/toyota-extends-brake-override-
154194.aspx 
31
 See http://pressroom.toyota.com/pr/tms/toyota-statement-on-march-23-trial-
155777.aspx 
32
 See http://pressroom.toyota.com/pr/tms/document/Y._Inaba_Testimony_to_ 
House_Committee_on_Oversight_and_Government_Reform_2-24-10.pdf 
33
 See http://pressroom.toyota.com/pr/tms/toyota-statement-on-rebuttal-of-
154775.aspx 
64 
 
34
 See http://pressroom.toyota.com/pr/tms/toyota-s-statement-in-regard-to-
154197.aspx 
35
 See http://pressroom.toyota.com/pr/tms/toyota-s-statement-in-regard-to-
154197.aspx 
36
 See http://pressroom.toyota.com/pr/tms/electronic-throttle-control-154300.aspx 
37
 See http://pressroom.toyota.com/pr/tms/toyota-statement-on-rebuttal-of-
154775.aspx 
38
 See http://pressroom.toyota.com/pr/tms/electronic-throttle-control-154300.aspx 
39 See http://pressroom.toyota.com/pr/tms/toyota-statement-on-march-23-trial-
155777.aspx 
40
 See http://pressroom.toyota.com/pr/tms/clarification-of-testimony-regarding-
154311.aspx 
41
 See http://pressroom.toyota.com/pr/tms/toyota-statement-on-media-reports-
154449.aspx 
42
 See http://pressroom.toyota.com/pr/tms/toyota/toyota-offers-preliminary-
findings-155268.aspx 
43
 See http://pressroom.toyota.com/pr/tms/toyota/toyota-offers-preliminary-
findings-155268.aspx 
44
 See http://pressroom.toyota.com/pr/tms/toyota/toyota-offers-preliminary-
findings-155268.aspx 
45
 See http://pressroom.toyota.com/pr/tms/toyota-statement-on-harrison-ny-
155656.aspx 
46
 See http://pressroom.toyota.com/pr/tms/document/Lentz_Testimony_to_ 
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House_Committee_on_Energy_and_Commerce.pdf 
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